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Abstract— Networks are hard to manage and in spite of all the
so called holistic management packages, things are getting worse.
We argue that this is an outcome of two fundamental flaws in
the existing architecture: the management plane depends on the
data plane and the complexity of the ever-evolving data plane en-
cumbers the management plane. Consequently, addressing these
flaws can make the network amenable to management. In this
paper, we present Complexity Oblivious Network Management
(CONMan), a network architecture in which the management
plane does not depend on the data plane and all data plane
protocols expose a generic management interface. This restricts
the operational complexity of protocols to their implementation
and allows the management plane to achieve high level policies in
a structured fashion. Our preliminary experience with building
the CONMan interface of a couple of protocols and using them for
real world management tasks indicates the architecture’s potential
to alleviate the management troubles of the Internet.
I. INTRODUCTION
IP networks are hard to manage. Network management
(installation, configuration, provisioning, monitoring, testing,
debugging) requires detailed knowledge of many different
network components, each with its own management interface.
To cope, network managers rely on a host of tools ranging
from sophisticated centralized network management packages
to home-brewed scripts and elementary tools such as ping and
traceroute. For instance, our organization uses half a dozen
different tools, commercial and public domain, and has over
100K lines of scripts for managing the switch and router
infrastructure alone (not including email, servers, DNS, DHCP,
billing, etc.). In spite of their ever increasing sophistication,
management tools seem to be waging a losing battle which
is shown by rising management costs and network downtime.
A recent survey [19] showed that 80% of the IT budget in
enterprises is devoted to maintain just the status quo - in
spite of this, configuration errors account for 62% of network
downtime.
We believe that the management troubles of the Internet are
a consequence of two shortcomings of the existing network
architecture. First, the existing management plane depends on
the data plane. For example, SNMP operates on top of the data
plane and hence, management protocols rely on the correct
operation of the very thing they are supposed to manage. This
dependency loop is a fundamental flaw that leads to:
• Manual pre-configuration. The network (at least the lower
levels) needs to be manually brought up before the
management applications can talk to the devices in the
network. Given the complexity of some of these low
level protocols, routing especially, significant manual and
therefore, error-prone configuration must be done before
they can operate correctly [5], [16]. Also, the disconnect
arising out of the fact that the management application is
not responsible for a complete, bottom-up configuration
of the network is a common cause for errors and miscon-
figurations [16].
• Poor failure-mode operation. The network manager may
not be able to communicate with network equipment when
a failure occurs, which is when the manager is most
needed [9].
Second, the fact that protocols expose their internal details
leads to a deluge of complexity which burdens the management
plane. For example, it is not uncommon for a network device
to have thousands of manageable objects. MIBDepot [47] lists
6200 MIBs (Management Information Base) from 142 vendors
for a total of nearly a million MIB objects. A single router
configuration file can consist of more than 10,000 command
lines [41]. Encumbering the management plane with all this
complexity leads to:
• Perception differs from reality. Management applications
need to effectively reverse engineer the capabilities and
the functionality of protocols and devices from their
detailed MIBs containing lots of internal parameters. The
low-level and non-intuitive nature of these parameters
makes this task difficult, if not impossible [30].
• Error-prone configuration. Network configuration in-
volves mapping high-level policies and goals to the values
of protocol parameters. Since management applications
don’t have an understanding of the underlying network in
the first place, they often resort to a cycle of setting the
parameters and correlating events to see if the high level
goal was achieved or not. Apart from being haphazard,
the noise in measurements and correlations is often the
root-cause of misconfigurations and related errors. The
inability to understand the network’s operation also makes
debugging these errors very difficult [22].
• Fragmentation of tools. Since devices and their internal
details keep evolving at a frantic pace and these details are
exposed to management applications, such applications
tend to lag behind the power curve [27]. Additionally,
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MIBs) to keep pace with data plane development has led
to a plethora of vendor specific MIBs and even vendor
specific management applications and has put us in a
situation where no one management approach suffices.
For example, SNMPLink [32] lists more than 1000 man-
agement applications, many of them being vendor specific
command line or HTML-based tools. Hence, the Internet
management plane doesn’t have anything analogous to the
IP thin waist around which the Internet data-plane is built.
• Lack of dependency maintenance. Management state
throughout the network tends to be riddled with proto-
col parameters and low-level values. These need to be
tracked so that management state can be updated when
the values change but the current management plane does
not do so [30]. Instances of improper filtering because
the address assigned to some machine changed, or the
application was started on some other port are very com-
mon. [21] details many examples of how failure to track
such dependencies leads to problems in large networks.
All these shortcomings point to the two principles that,
we believe, should form the basis of a manageable network
architecture:
(a). Operationally independent, self bootstrapping manage-
ment plane. The management plane should be opera-
tionally independent of the data plane and should be
able to bootstrap without any pre-configuration (this was
proposed as part of the 4D project [16] and is extended
in this paper). This would allow for a management plane
that can configure a network from the ground up. Also,
the ability to manage the devices as long as they have
physical connectivity has implications for all facets of
network management, especially the ability to operate in
the face of failures.
(b). A single, simple management interface for all data
plane protocols. The operational complexity of protocols
should be confined to their implementation and they
should express the information needed for managing
them through a simple management interface. This puts
the responsibility for detailed understanding of protocol
operation on the protocol implementor while reducing
the burden on management applications. Since the pro-
tocol implementer requires this knowledge in any event,
this seems to be a smarter placement of functionality.
In this paper we present the design and implementation of
a network architecture, Complexity Oblivious Network Man-
agement (CONMan), that follows these principles. CONMan
includes an extension of the 4D configuration-free management
channel. This channel is established and maintained separately
from the data plane and hence, serves as a substrate for the
rest of the management framework. All protocols and devices
express their capability and their functionality using a generic
abstraction. This allows the management plane to understand
the potential of the underlying network, to configure it in
line with the desired high-level policies and to fix it when
something breaks, without being encumbered by the details of
the protocol/device implementation. Having a fixed interface
between the management plane and the data plane also allows
for independent evolution of the two. Hence, this paper makes
the following contributions:
• We propose a set of architectural principles that a network
conducive to management should be based on.
• We present the detailed design of a network architecture
following these principles.
• The paper also describes the implementation of the man-
agement interface of two protocols in compliance with the
proposed architecture.
CONMan does not change the operation of data plane
protocols nor does it dictate the way they are implemented
– only the management interface of each protocol should
conform to our proposal. Consequently, while the paper talks
about individual protocol modules and the components of their
management interface, the underlying implementation may not
be modular. For example, a monolithic network stack that
exposes the appropriate abstraction for all its protocols fits
just as well into our proposal. Hence, a non contribution of
this paper is the notion of implementation modularity.
While we admit that our experience with modeling protocols
according to CONMan is rather limited, the importance of en-
suring network manageability is not disputable. In this context,
we hope that our proposal would stimulate a discussion about
structured management of networks and hence, serve as a step
towards the holy grail of self managing networks.
II. CONMAN ARCHITECTURE
We have designed a network architecture, CONMan, based
on the principles described in section I. Here we describe the
architecture in detail.
A. Terminology and Overview
Our architecture consists of devices (routers, switches, hosts,
etc.) and one or more network managers (NMs). A NM is a
software entity that resides on one of the network devices and
manages some or all of them. Each device has a identifier
(device-id) and an internal management agent (MA) that is
responsible for the device’s participation in the management
plane. The device-id is globally unique, topology independent
and can even carry cryptographic meaning (for example, by
hashing a public key). All protocols and applications in devices
are modeled as protocol modules. While the rest of the paper
talks about a device performing management tasks, in actuality
it is the device’s MA that is responsible for these.
CONMan achieves the first principle by borrowing tech-
niques used by 4D for its discovery and dissemination
plane [16]. We briefly describe the set-up of our management
plane here and refer the reader to [16] for details. All de-
vices and NMs can send management frames to their directly
connected neighbors over the (almost) raw physical link. This
allows devices to determine their physical connectivity. Beyond
this, each NM periodically floods the network with beacons
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and hence, provide each device with a path to the NM in
question. This allows the devices to send source-routed frames
to the NM. In turn, the NM can now get back to these devices
and thus, this forms the NM’s management channel. Note that
the management channel does not require any pre-configuration
and is completely independent of the data plane paths in the
network.
As mentioned earlier, a given network can have more than
one NM. Also, the basic notion of a management channel
as presented above requires various extensions, for instance
to allow communication between NMs belonging to separate
networks. We defer discussion of these extensions to section II-
F. For ease of exposition, the following discussion focusses on
a network under the control of a single administrative entity
with just one NM.
In order to satisfy the second principle, protocol modules
self describe themselves using a generic abstraction - this is the
Module Abstraction. The driving idea behind our abstraction
is to identify the basic characteristics that virtually all pro-
tocols share. Consequently, we model every protocol module
as a node with connections to other nodes, certain generic
switching capabilities, certain generic filtering capabilities,
certain performance and security characteristics, and certain
dependencies. This abstraction captures what the protocol is
capable of (capabilities) and what it depends on (dependen-
cies). Also, the module can be configured to achieve the desired
functionality by creating and deleting various components of
the abstraction. Finally, modeling all protocols using a generic
abstraction decouples the data and the management plane so
that they can evolve independently of each other. Hence, the
module abstraction provides the narrow waist around which
our management-oriented architecture is designed.
Together, the management channel and the module abstrac-
tion allow the NM to manage the network based on high-level
policies and goals in a structured fashion. Each device uses
the management channel to inform the NM of its physical
connectivity, all modules that it contains and their respective
module abstractions. This provides the NM with the real
picture of the network - it does not need to reverse engineer
numerous low-level and non-intuitive parameters. The module
abstraction allows the NM to understand exactly how packets
may flow (or not flow) through a given module and hence,
from application to application.
Given the network’s real picture and the high-level goals
and policies that need to be satisfied, the NM builds a graph
of modules in various devices that satisfy these. This graph
captures how each module should function and hence, how
each module should be configured. The NM then configures the
modules accordingly through the management channel. Thus,
the NM can configure the entire network from the ground up
with a minimum of protocol-specific knowledge. We believe
that such as approach would ameliorate most of the problems
afflicting network management today.
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Fig. 1. Modules, pipes, and dependencies form a graph that describes the
operation of a device (in particular) and the network (in general). The figure
on the right shows the major components of the module abstraction. Note
that some modules may not require all elements of the abstraction to describe
themselves.
B. Module abstraction
There are two kinds of modules: data plane modules and
control plane modules. Examples of data plane modules (or
data modules for short) include TCP1, IP, Ethernet, while
examples of control plane modules (or control modules for
short) include routing algorithms and negotiation algorithms
like IPSec’s IKE or PPP’s LCP and NCPs.
Data modules connect to each other to carry data packets.
These connections are called pipes. Control modules also
connect to data modules using pipes for delivery services. Data
modules may require the use of a control module; we refer
to this as a dependency. For instance, in Figure 1, the IPsec
module has a (data plane) pipe to IP, and has a dependency on
IKE, which in turn has a pipe to UDP. Ultimately, modules,
pipes, and dependencies form a graph that in some sense
describes the operation of the network.
The actual module abstraction, as shown on the right in
figure 1, tries the capture the capabilities, the dependencies and
the functionality of protocol modules in generic and abstract
terms. Below we comment on pipes and the components of the
module abstraction.
1) Pipes: Up and Down pipes connect modules to other
modules above and below themselves in the same device.
Such pipes are point-to-point only. Point-to-point pipes are
modeled as unidirectional (and usually come in pairs), though
for simplicity we present them as bidirectional. The actual
network links are modeled as Physical Across pipes (or across
pipes for short) and can be point-to-point or broadcast. Hence,
the path between two modules in two different devices is the
sequence of up-down and physical across pipes through which
packets travel between the modules. Also, pipes have identifiers
which the NM can use to refer to them.
Physical across pipes either exist or don’t; devices discover
them by exchanging management frames with their neighbors
over the raw physical links. As a contrast, the NM can actually
create up and down pipes to construct paths between modules.
Such pipes may have dependencies that need to be satisfied
1The paper does not provide citations or acronym definitions for standard
protocols.
4before they can be created. For example, a pipe may require
other pipes to be created or switch state to be specified (see
below) before it can be created. Applications can also lead to
creation of pipes. For example, a HTTP-client initiating a TCP
connection may lead to pipes between the following module
pairs: {HTTP-client, TCP}, {TCP, IP}, and {IP, ETH}.
Up and down pipes are also associated with a list of
connectable-modules. For example, the connectable-modules
for the down pipe of a particular TCP module might be re-
stricted to {IPv4, IPv6} implying that the TCP implementation
in question can only operate on top of (have a down pipe to)
IPv4 or IPv6.
While modules pass packets between up and down pipes,
the end goal is to be able to communicate with modules
in other devices. To capture this, we introduce the notion
of peer modules. For example, the peer modules of a given
TCP module are the TCP modules that this module has TCP
connections to. Also, each module is associated with a set
of peerable-modules. For example, the peerable-modules for a
TCP module is restricted to {TCP} while the peerable-modules
for a HTTP-server module may be restricted to {HTTP-client}.
2) Module Name: The module-name is a tuple <A,X,y>
comprising of the protocol name A, the device-id X, the
module-id y. Examples of protocol names include “IPv4”,
“RFC791”, or even a URI (which might be useful for naming
applications). The module-id is a locally unique number as-
signed to the module by the device MA. Given that the device-
id is a globally unique number, the module-name uniquely
identifies the module while the module-id allows multiple
modules for the same protocol to exist within the same device.
3) Switch: Switches capture the ability of modules to pass
packets between up, down and physical across pipes. A switch
can be unicast or multicast and can have a small number of
basic configurations: packets pass between down and up pipes
([down ⇒ up] and [up ⇒ down] switching, e.g. TCP module),
[down ⇒ down] switching (e.g. IP module with forwarding
enabled), [up ⇒ up] switching (e.g. IP module with loopback
functionality), [up ⇒ physical] and [physical ⇒ up] switching
(eg. Ethernet module). A module advertises the potential and
actual configuration of its internal switch, thus allowing an NM
to know what paths are and are not possible.
Of course, switches may also have switching state which
conditions the switching. The module advertises if the switch
state is produced locally through the protocol operation or
needs to be provided externally. For instance, an up-pipe from
TCP to an application is selected by the port number chosen
by the application and hence, the [down ⇒ up] switch state
is created locally through the protocol operation. In other
switches, such as those of IP or MPLS modules, the switching
state is not generated out of the protocol operation and needs
to be provided externally. This can either be calculated by
some control module (e.g., BGP) or directly set by the NM
(as proposed in 4D). The need for externally generated state
is discussed in section II-E.
4) Filters: It is common for protocol modules like Eth-
ernet or IP to filter, often based on deep packet inspection.
The module abstraction captures this by allowing modules
to advertise their filtering capabilities. The filter specification
includes the classification based on which filtering can be done;
for example, the module might be able to filter packets from
or to specified IP, TCP and HTTP modules or even specific
pipes of these modules. The filter might be per pipe, per
direction (incoming or outgoing), or there might just be a
module-wide filter such that each filter rule is applied to all
traffic traversing the module. Note that the NM only needs to
specify the module-names that need to be filtered - it is the
protocol implementation that is responsible for determining the
relevant protocol fields. This process and other related issues
are detailed in section II-D.
5) Performance Reporting: Modules may report on the
performance of their connectivity to each of their peer modules
and their ability to do so is advertised. In our current abstrac-
tion, performance is reported in terms of six generic perfor-
mance metrics - delay, jitter, bandwidth, loss-rate, error-rate,
and ordering. These encompass most of the IP performance
metrics proposed by IETF [38] (though in our architecture the
metrics can be used by any module that has the ability to
describe its performance, not just the IP module). Apart from
this, a module may also report on other performance criteria
associated with the abstraction components, for instance filter
lookup or switching time, number of packets on various pipes,
and so on.
6) Performance Trade-Offs: Most protocols, as part of their
operation, can offer performance trade-offs. For example, many
MAC layer protocols offer optional error correcting checksums
which represent a trade-off between error-rate on one hand and
bandwidth and delay on the other. Similarly, the amount of
buffering done by the IP module provides a trade-off between
loss-rate and delay/jitter. Instead of exposing the low-level
options and the associated parameters, modules specify the
trade-offs they can enforce. Just as with filters, the module
might allow these trade-offs to be applied to specific traffic
classes as specified by the names of modules or pipes and
this too is advertised. Also, all the trade-offs are in terms of
the generic performance metrics mentioned above. The NM,
based on some high-level performance goals, can choose from
the trade-offs offered by these modules who can then configure
and coordinate the low level values.
While we would like to restrict our performance metrics
to a small list that is closely related to the typical high-
level policy goals, we realize that network evolution would
certainly warrant addition to our current list. Similarly, though
Internet management has been CONMan’s focus, applying the
framework to management of other networks such as ad-hoc
networks brings to light new metrics and new trade-offs. For
example, power is an important performance metric in such
networks. And the use of ARQ by a layer-2 module is an
example power trade-off - it represents a trade-off between
power and delay on one hand and error-rate on the other.
Hence, we envision that policies to be enforced by NMs
5will also evolve with the network2. An NM with old policies
(the ones used for wired networks) won’t be able to take
advantage of the power trade-offs on offer when managing an
ad-hoc network. However, a reformulation of the policies to
incorporate power would allow the NM to map power related
high-level goals to module configurations.
7) Performance Enforcement: Satisfying performance re-
quirements of applications by utilizing the performance en-
forcement capabilities of devices is an important part of
network management. We envision that the network high-level
policy would include application priorities specified by the
user/administrator and performance requirements specified by
applications. For example, a VOIP application module may
specify that it requires x Kbps of bandwidth3. For legacy
applications that do not advertise their requirements, the NM
can use performance reports of other modules to determine
the same. For example, the NM can determine the bandwidth
requirement of a TCP-based application by asking the TCP
module for the performance report of the pipe connecting the
TCP module to the application module. In some cases, the
administrator may have to provide these.
There seem to be two approaches for modeling the per-
formance enforcement capabilities of modules. In the first
approach, performance is modeled through queues and shapers.
There are a limited number of queue and shaper types and
configurations, and hence, modules advertise these. The NM
uses application priorities, performance requirements and its
own measurements to configure modules that are capable of
performance enforcement. Note that even in this approach, the
NM does not deal with low-level values such as DiffServ code
points (assuming that the IP module’s DiffServ capabilities are
being used for performance) to identify a traffic class.
The second approach further abstracts the traffic manage-
ment mechanisms offered by modules by allowing them to
advertise the service classes they can provide. These service
classes are tuples of performance metrics described earlier. For
example, <very low delay, very low jitter, very low loss, con-
stant rate, very low error, good ordering> might be one class
while <low delay, best-effort jitter, low loss, variable rate, low
error, best-effort ordering> may be another. This modeling is
similar to the service class based DiffServ configuration [3],
though we don’t restrict ourself to DiffServ based performance
enforcement. With this approach, the NM needs to map policy
goals to the advertised service classes while it is the protocol
implementation that maps service classes to queues and shapers
(see [3] for a detailed description of how typical applications
may be mapped).
These two approaches represent a trade-off between the
amount of detail the NM has to handle and the flexibility
in performance enforcement. While we are not sure about
the performance model that should be part of the module
abstraction, it might be the case that the choice is guided by
2this does not necessitate NM re-implementation and so, is different from
forcing the management plane to follow all device and protocol changes.
3the application may provide even more information, for example it requires
x Kbps of <very-low delay, very-low jitter, very-low loss> bandwidth.
Name Caller Callee Description
showPotential NM MA of device Sec. II-C.1
showActual NM MA of device Sec. II-C.1
create, delete NM MA of device Sec. II-C.1
conveyMessage Module (source) NM Sec. II-C.1
conveyMessage NM Module (destination) Sec. II-C.1
test NM Module Sec. II-C.2
listFieldsAndValues Module (inspecting) NM Sec. II-D
listFieldsAndValues NM Module (target) Sec. II-D
TABLE I
FUNCTIONS THAT ARE PART OF THE CONMAN ARCHITECTURE
the kind of network. The first approach might work better for
networks with sophisticated performance requirements such as
ISPs, while the second approach might be better for smaller
networks such as enterprises and home networks.
8) Security: A module may have the means to ensure the
integrity, authenticity or confidentiality (or some combination
of the three) of its communication with any given peer. Such
modules advertise their ability to establish secure communi-
cation. The state associated with these security features, for
example the keying material, may be determined by the module
through interaction with the peer module (example, SSL). In
other cases, this state may have to be provided by an external
entity and is advertised as a dependency (example, IP-Sec
dependency on IKE).
C. Network Manager (NM)
The NM maintains a management channel that allows two-
way communication between itself and the devices in the net-
work. Each device informs the NM of its physical connectivity,
thus allowing the NM to determine the network topology.
Beyond this, the NM must determine both the existing con-
figuration and the capabilities of the modules in the individual
devices on the basis of which it can configure the network and
debug network problems.
1) Network Configuration: Given the network reality, the
NM can configure devices and achieve high level network goals
simply by creating and deleting pipes and module components.
The following functions capture the NM’s interaction with the
devices in the network as part of network configuration. Table I
shows these and other functions offered by the NM, the MAs
of devices, and the modules themselves.
• showPotential () allows the NM to determine a device’s
potential configuration. The device returns a list of mod-
ules with their abstractions. The type of information
returned for each module is shown in table II.
• showActual () allows the NM to determine the actual
connectivity and state of modules in a device. The state
of each module includes state for all the pipes, the switch,
filters, trade-offs, performance and security enforcement
elements. Also returned is a report on the performance
parameters. In effect, the NM is presented with the net-
work reality - a module graph and associated information
which allows it to understand how the device (and hence,
the network) is or should be behaving. By contrast, in the
6Parameter What is advertised?
Name <A,x,y>
Up and Information about up and down pipes such as
Down pipes connectable-modules, dependencies etc.
Physical Information about the physical across pipes (if any) connected
across pipes to the module
Peerable-Mod. Set of modules that can be peers of this module
Filter Classification based on which filtering can be done - this
includes what can be filtered and where it can be filtered
Switch Possible switching between up, down and physical pipes;
the kind of switch state that governs the switching and if
it is generated locally or needs to be provided externally
Performance Performance metrics that are reported for the module’s pipes,
Reporting filters, switch etc.
Performance Traffic classes to which performance trade-offs can be
Trade-Offs applied and the possible trade-offs
Performance Apart from the classification based on which performance
Enforcement can be enforced, the module advertises one of these:
(1) Queuing and Shaping capabilities
(2) Service classes on offer
Security Ability to secure communication with the peer modules. If
the state needed for this is to be provided, it is
advertised as a dependency.
TABLE II
MODULE ABSTRACTION; showPotential () DESCRIBES EACH
MODULE USING THIS ABSTRACTION
current set up, the NM is presented with all kinds of MIB
objects from which it must deduce network behavior.
• create () and delete () allow the NM to create and delete
pipes, filter-rules, switch-rules, trade-offs to be enforced
and performance enforcement state (queuing structures or
service classes). Note that the showPotential () function
provides the NM with all the information it needs to create
and delete components.
The NM needs very little protocol specific knowledge to use
these primitives. For instance, it can create up and down pipes
simply by satisfying their dependencies and invoking the create
function. It is the protocol implementation that is responsible
for all the protocol-specific exchange and configuration that
needs to be done to actually install the state that instantiates the
pipe. For example, establishing an up pipe for a GRE module
amounts to creating a new GRE tunnel and hence, requires the
module to communicate with its peer GRE module about the
tunnel key values to be used. The GRE module advertises this
need for peer coordination as a dependency. To facilitate the
actual co-ordination between peer modules, the NM provides:
• conveyMessage () allows modules to convey messages
to each other through the NM (see detailed example in
section III-B).
2) Debugging: In CONMan, modules provide a test ()
function with which the NM can test connectivity of the
module to any of its peer modules. Invoking the test function
causes the module to check protocol specific parameters with
the desired peer module through the management channel
(using conveyMessage). Testing might also require modules
to send packets to their peer over the data plane. Some
existing protocol implementations, for example Cisco’s GRE
implementation [45], already have something akin to such a
test function. Also, Microsoft is currently working on adding a
similar functionality to help users debug the Windows network
stack [35]. Here, a process is able ask protocol modules if they
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Fig. 2. Modules A and L are unable to communicate: the test function
offered by modules allows the NM to perform a stackwide parameter check.
This, coupled with the NM’s ability to trace the path between the devices,
makes root-cause analysis of the problem possible.
believe themselves to be healthy.
Given a problem in communication between two application
modules, the NM can debug it by tracing and testing the
sequence of modules and pipes between them. For instance,
lets assume modules A and L in figure 2 are having problems
communicating. To ensure that A and L agree on their protocol
specific parameters, the NM invokes the test function at these
modules. Beyond this, debugging of the problem devolves
to the debugging of the modules and pipes along the path
between A and L. The actual state of the modules (as given by
showActual) and the test function offered by them allows the
NM to trace and test modules B through K. Hence, the NM
checks to see if module B forwards packets from pipe (1) to
(2) and then uses its test function to test B’s connectivity to
module K (B’s peer) and so on for all the modules involved. We
think that through such a structured debugging approach, the
NM can determine the root-cause of most network problems.
D. Component identifiers
The NM uses identifiers for the abstraction components such
as module names, pipes identifiers etc. to specify traffic classes.
Modules can then be directed to operate on these classes - filter
them, switch them or even ensure some performance character-
istics. For example, the NM can simply ask a module to filter
packets between two given modules - “check if the packet
is from module <IP,B,y> and going to <FOO,C,z>” (where
FOO is an application module with up-down pipes to TCP).
This ensures that the NM, while being opaque to protocol-
specific fields, can trace the paths between applications and
hence, can reason about its policies regarding a particular
application-module.
It is the protocol module doing the filtering that is respon-
sible for determining the actual protocol fields. For example,
given the high-level specification above, the module determines
that it needs to “filter packets from source address 128.19.2.3
and destined to address 20.3.4.5, port 592”. In some cases, the
inspecting module may know what fields and field values to
check for on its own. But in other cases, it may not.
In CONMan, modules provide a listFieldsAndValues () func-
tion. This allows other modules to query the target module
for the low-level fields and field values corresponding to
the identifiers associated with its components. Hence, in the
7example above, the inspecting module can send queries to the
target modules <IP,B,y> and <FOO,C,z> (via the NM), as
well as to the modules below them, and ask those modules
what field values it should be checking for.
Such an approach also allows for maintenance of network
state dependencies - the need to update the relevant state in dif-
ferent modules when some low-level value in a given module
changes. To ensure this, the NM maintains the dependencies
between component identifiers (that have been resolved) and
low-level fields. Also, the NM installs triggers in the target
modules telling them to inform the NM when their low-level
values change.
However, the use of component identifiers also raises a
number of issues. First, frequent invocations of listFieldsAnd-
Values() and maintaining all the dependencies between compo-
nent identifiers and the low-level values can generate a lot of
management traffic and create a bottleneck at the NM. While
good engineering design involving caching of information and
having stackable NMs may partly address this, it could be
the case that the traffic and processing overhead represents an
acceptable trade-off when seen in the light of the increase in
network manageability.
Second, there are cases that do not seem to be easily handled
by a NM using component identifiers. For instance, some fil-
tering instances like matching on regular expressions in HTML
are difficult to capture using component identifiers and must
simply be explicitly set by some sort of a specialized NM such
as an Intrusion Detection System. Similarly, making best-match
hierarchical IP address inspection opaque is difficult [13].
Given the ubiquity of IPv4, the scarcity of addresses and the
restrictions on assigning them, it makes a lot of engineering
sense for the NM to have protocol-specific knowledge in this
case and assign addresses by itself.
Third, the presence of translation devices such as NATs,
NAPTs etc. in the network can invalidate the low-level values
returned by a target module at the inspecting module. In our
architecture, such translation devices advertise their translation
functionality to the NM. Hence, the NM must trace the path(s)4
from the target module to the inspecting module to see if any
module translates the fields in question and if yes, ask the
module for the translated value. The final translated value is
then returned to the querying module.
Finally, the above example also doesn’t work if some of
the target modules are in a different domain, and therefore not
accessible to the NM. The NM can realize this and in some
cases, direct the inspection to be based on incoming interface.
For example, to inspect packets from a customer network, the
NM can ask for inspection based on the customer physical pipe
instead of specifying the customer prefix. In other cases, the
NM may need to explicitly specify IP addresses or other fields
to identify modules. Communication between NMs in different
domains can avoid this and is discussed in section II-F.
4the NM determines these paths using its knowledge of the network topology
E. Control Modules
Many data-plane protocols rely on externally generated state
for their operation. In CONMan, data modules generate some
of this state from the create/delete instructions given by the NM
while some state can be determined through the interaction
with peer modules. However, there are scenarios where this
state cannot be generated by CONMan locally or through peer
interaction, for instance the switch state for an IP module
(commonly referred to as the IP forwarding table).
In the Internet, control-plane protocols generate some of the
state required for data plane operation. For example, routing
protocols generate the IP routing table. Similarly, LCP gener-
ates PPP configuration state. With CONMan, control modules
do not fit into the generic module abstraction presented earlier.
Instead, they advertise their ability to provide the state for cer-
tain data modules and the NM simply uses them. For example,
the PPP module could advertise that it has a dependency on
external state (say, X) and the LCP module advertises that it
can satisfy dependency X. While such an approach suffices in
some cases, there are also cases when the control module itself
requires quite a bit of configuration. Also, the fact that the NM
does not generate this state hinders its ability to understand
related network operations and gets in the way of root-cause
analysis. Finally, errors in control module operation cannot
always be debugged by the NM. For example, the NM does
not understand BGP and hence, cannot be expected to debug
route flaps and the resulting prefix dampening.
In most of these cases, the NM can replace the control
protocols and use some high-level goal to generate the required
state itself. Of course, this implies that the state generation
logic must be embedded into the NM. For example, the
4D research argues for the replacement of routing protocols,
with the NM using its knowledge of the topology to set the
switch state for IP modules in devices across the network.
A characterization of the scenarios in which existing control
protocols should be retained against the ones in which they
should be replaced is part of our future work.
F. Multiple NMs
While the architectural description in the previous section
focussed on a single NM managing the network, multiple NMs
may exist in a network. Primary and secondary NMs will be
needed for robustness (4D focusses on this scenario). In such
a set up, one primary NM controls the network at any given
time, and another takes over should the primary fail. However,
we can also imagine multiple simultaneously operating NMs.
One reason for this might be that NMs do specialized jobs. For
example, one is responsible for tunnel creation while another
monitors for security violations. Another reason might be that
NMs are administratively nested. For example, a high-level
NM creates VLANs, but each VLAN has its own NM. And
if nothing else, competition between vendors would dictate
that multiple NMs tussle for control [8], and therefore have
to cooperate with each other. The possibility of multiple
NMs implies that the architecture should allow for multiple
8management channels. Also, different NMs may have different
scopes, i.e. they might be allowed to manage a subset of the
devices in the network.
In CONMan, a NM establishes its own management channel
by flooding beacons and hence, multiple management channels
can exist. One way to restrict each NM to its scope is to include
a list of device-ids in the beacons that the NM generates.
While such an approach might work in small networks such
as home networks, other networks such as enterprises might
require something more secure and scalable. A solution at
the other end of the spectrum involves allowing the NM to
flood the network but requiring them to produce cryptographic
tokens for the devices they want to manage. This would
require pre-configuring each device in the network with the
network-wide public key. Given this, the human manager can
generate capabilities allowing access to only a subset of the
devices and hence, NMs can be securely restricted to desired
scopes. Extending this, devices could be given their own keying
material (say, a public-private key pair or a self certifying
device-id [29]). This would allow authenticated (and encrypted,
if desired) communication between devices and NMs and
would allow devices to determine if a neighboring device is
part of the same network.
With regards to the network configuration, having multiple
NMs raises the possibility of conflicting configurations. While
this is also the case with the existing management plane,
the fact that NMs understand the abstraction exposed by all
modules makes it easier to detect and resolve conflicts. One
way to avoid conflicts in the first place would be to ensure that
a module can only by managed by a given control NM and
all other NMs needing to configure the module go through the
control NM. In effect, this allows the control NM to avoid
configuration mismatches. However, any approach that puts
one NM in charge raises fears of vendor lock-in and hence,
this needs to explored further.
Finally, we would like to ensure that each management chan-
nel follows the principle of least-privileges. Hence, devices
should be restricted to communication with the NM when using
the management channel. There is a large design space for
addressing this goal with different assumptions, overheads and
resulting solution properties. In our current proposal, we adopt
a simple solution - devices only forward management-frames
that are either sourced from or destined to the NM.
Of course, different domains will have their own NMs that
may need to communicate with each other. In the past, this
problem has been considered in the context of trouble reporting
and diagnostics [36]. The trust relationship between neighbor-
ing domains can be used to allow for NMs in neighboring
domains to communicate through their respective management
channels. For example, an ISP could provide its subscribers
with the relevant keying material at installation time. Using
this, the NM of a home network can communicate with NM
of the ISP without depending on the data path. Such a set-
up would be very beneficial in providing customer support for
low level network problems. Similarly, neighboring ISPs could
exchange the keying material along with the other information
that is currently exchanged during peering establishment. This
would serve to reduce the reliance on communication through
phones and mailing-lists when things go wrong. In most cases
such domains represent competing entities and hence, the NM
of one domain would only be allowed to communicate with the
NM of the other domain. Other issues concerning the structure
of management information shared across domains given the
conflicting interests are important but beyond the scope of this
paper.
However, this would not work for inter-NM communication
across far separated domains. In these cases, the part of the
communication between the two NM’s outside their networks
will be on top of the data plane (i.e. over IP). This means that
there are a few failure modes that the NM cannot account for
(for example, failures in the network between the domains),
something that seems to be endemic of the distributed nature
of the Internet.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
CONMan does not necessitate any changes to the way data
plane protocols operate. The modeling of protocols as modules
and the associated functions can be implemented as wrappers
around existing implementations. Using this approach, we have
implemented two protocols (GRE and IP) in compliance with
the abstraction model presented in section II-B. In the rest of
the paper, an existing protocol Pold that has been abstracted is
referred to as Pnew. Here, we touch upon our implementation
efforts and walk through actual configuration scenarios. Due
to space constraints, our IP protocol implementation (IPnew)
is briefly mentioned in the tunneling example (section III-B)
and the performance management example (section III-C) but
is not described per se.
A. Management Channel
We have implemented a management channel that operates
in a network comprised of Linux-based PCs operating as end-
hosts and routers with Ethernet as the connecting medium.
The MA on each device and the NM have the ability to send
management frames encapsulated in ethernet frames. This was
achieved through sockets of the SOCK PACKET family that
allow user-level processes to send raw ethernet frames. Having
the management channel run over the link layer instead of the
raw physical link avoids the need to change the Ethernet device
driver but does imply that our implementation would treat
Ethernet problems as lack of connectivity. Also, our imple-
mentation determines the MTU restrictions of the underlying
medium and hence, fragments and reassembles management
data to and from appropriate sized frames respectively. Apart
from the use of management frames by devices to discover
their neighbors, devices and NMs also participate in the build
up of the management channel (briefly described in section II-
A). This allows for two way communication between the MA
of each device and the NM and hence, provides a substrate for
the tunelling example that follows.
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Fig. 3. Module connectivity in a device with three GRE tunnels to two
different devices - the figure on the left shows the way GRE-IP modules are
modeled in this paper while the figure on the right shows another possible
model for GRE-IP modules
B. GRE tunneling
Tunneling is a tool present in the kit of most system
administrators. Traditionally, tunnels have been used for both
plain (IP-IP, GRE) and secure (IP-Sec) communication be-
tween two private networks. Lately, tunnels have also been
used by ISPs for DoS-protection (ArborNetworks [44]) and
traffic engineering (MPLS [46]). In spite of their widespread
use, a look at most network management newsgroups suggests
that tunnels pose many configuration and debugging problems
(about 5-10% of the postings on [49]). For example, a simple-
to-address yet very common problem is the tunnel end-points
not agreeing on parameters such as addresses, keys etc. An
IETF group [11] is looking at exactly such tunnel configuration
problems.
Here, we use the GRE protocol to elucidate and contrast
the establishment and debugging of tunnels in the existing
and the proposed architecture. GRE is an encapsulation pro-
tocol that can be used to encapsulate any network protocol
(payload protocol) in any other network protocol (delivery
protocol). However, an actual implementation of GRE is highly
dependent on the delivery protocol. We focus on GRE with
IPv4 as the underlying delivery protocol - GRE-IP . Hence,
each tunnel is characterized by a source and a destination IP
address. Besides this, GRE also allows key’ing of tunnels - the
source and the destination must agree on the key for the tunnel
to operate correctly. Hence, configuring a GRE-IPold tunnel
involves determining the following:
• IP addresses of tunnel end-points
• Key values - keying of the tunnels allows for differentia-
tion of the tunnel traffic. The key is chosen by the receiver
independent of the key in the other direction and must not
conflict with other keys at the receiving end.
• Sequence number usage - sequence numbers help with
in-order delivery of the tunneled packets and can be used
independently in both directions.
• Other protocol specific values such as the tunnel TTL,
the TOS field for the tunneled packets, whether to use
the checksums or not, whether to use path-mtu-discovery
or not.
1) GRE-IPnew : We have implemented a GRE-IPnew
module conforming to the CONMan architecture. Our imple-
mentation is based on the Linux GRE kernel module with a
user-level wrapper that presents the module details using the
generic abstraction. This confines all decisions on how packets
fields are used for demultiplexing and other protocol-specific
details to the implementation. While the way demultiplexing
is done reflects how the implementor chooses to divide func-
tionality between various protocols and is not of any interest
to the NM, it does impact the parameters that a module needs
to determine when the NM creates and deletes pipes. Hence,
we start by presenting some of these internal details.
In our current implementation, a single GRE-IPnew module
models all GRE over IP tunnels originating from a device.
Since a GRE-IP tunnel is characterized by the IP addresses of
the tunnel end-points and a key value in each direction, we
chose to model the demultiplexing of incoming GRE packets
as split into two phases. The IP module below the GRE-IPnew
module demultiplexes packets based on the source-destination
address pair. Hence, the number of down pipes for the GRE-
IPnew module is equal to the number of distinct source-
destination address pairs for tunnels originating from this
device. The GRE-IPnew module then demultiplexes packets
from each down pipe into an up pipe based on the key value.
Thus, each up pipe for the GRE-IPnew module represents a
separate GRE-IP tunnel originating from the device.
The left part of figure 3 shows the module connectivity with
our current model for a device with three GRE-IP tunnels;
two of these tunnels are to the same peer device (i.e. two of
them have the same source-destination address pair)5. Hence,
the GRE-IPnew module has three up pipes representing the
three tunnels and two down pipes representing the fact that
these tunnels are to two distinct peer devices. The figure
also shows the path for a packet that originates at the device
and gets tunneled on the way out. There are other possible
models for GRE-IP tunneling, such as one where the GRE-
IPnew module has just one down pipe. The figure on the
right shows such a scenario - in such a model, the GRE-
IPnew module is responsible for both stages of demultiplexing.
Hence, tunnel establishment in our model involves the GRE-
IPnew module determining the key values and the IP module
determining the IP addresses of the end points (as explained
later in this section). In the alternate model, the GRE-IPnew
module would have to be responsible for both.
Such internal details are not exposed to the NM. The
abstraction exposed by our GRE-IPnew module to the NM
is shown in table III and some of the entries are explained
below:
b). Ideally, GRE can carry any payload protocol and hence,
there should not be any restriction on the modules that can be
connected to using an up pipe. However, most implementations
restrict the payload protocol to a well defined list of protocols
- with our underlying Linux implementation, the only payload
protocol possible is IPv4.
c). To create an up pipe, the NM needs to specify the name
of the peer GRE-IPnew module. In effect, this allows the
5the figure assumes that the IP modules above and below the GRE-IPnew
module are different, as the case may be in virtual routers. However, the same
discussion applies even when the same IP module is above and below the
GRE-IPnew module.
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Parameter Value
a Name <GRE-IPv4,device-id,module-id>
b Up.Con-Modules IPv4
(Connectable-Modules)
c Up.Dependencies Peer GRE-IPv4 module
d Down.Con-Modules IPv4
e Down.Dependencies Nil
f Physical Across pipes Nil
g Peerable-modules GRE-IPv4
h Filter Nil
i Switch [Up ⇒one, unicast Down | Auto]
[Down ⇒many, unicast Up | Auto]
j Perf Reporting Recieved and Transmitted packets
on each up and down pipe
k Perf Trade-Offs {[Jitter, Delay] Vs [In-order delivery] | Up }
{[Loss-Rate] Vs [Error-Rate] | Up}
l Perf Enforcement Nil
m Security Nil
TABLE III
GRE-IPnew ABSTRACTION EXPOSED BY OUR IMPLEMENTATION
Device  
A
Device  
B
IP      
GRE-IP     
(a)  
( local ) 
IP (b)   
Eth  (c)   
IP      
GRE-IP     
(a’)  
( peer ) 
IP (b’)   
Eth (c’)   
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Fig. 4. GRE-IP tunnel between devices A and B - the relevant module
connectivity is shown here.
module to coordinate various protocol specific values with the
peer module.
d) The module is restricted to having IPv4 as the tunneling
protocol.
e). No dependencies need to be satisfied for establishment of
a down-pipe.
i). The module has the following switching capabilities: up
pipe to a single down pipe and down pipe to many up pipes
(the switch is still unicast i.e. any given packet from a down
pipe is still switched to a single up pipe). The actual switching
state is produced automatically by the module.
j) The underlying Linux implementation provides limited per-
formance reporting: the number of packets transmitted and
received on each up and down pipe. Performance metrics for
connectivity to peer modules are not reported.
k). The module offers the following trade-offs: For a specified
up pipe, it can trade-off delay and jitter for in-order delivery.
The fact that this is attained by enabling sequence numbers
whose use needs to be coordinated with the peer module is
not exposed. Similarly, the module can trade-off loss-rate for
error-rate for a specified up pipe through the use of checksums.
The NM can establish a GRE-IP tunnel by creating the
requisite pipes. Consider the establishment of a tunnel between
devices A and B. The relevant modules are shown in figure 4.
The process by which the NM configures a tunnel is labeled as
Configuration by NM in figure 5 and is discussed below. We
only discuss the functions invoked at device A; the invocations
at B are similar. Also, the description below is for the scenario
when both A and B are in the same domain; establishment
of cross-domain tunnels can be achieved in a similar fashion
through inter-NM communication.
First, given its knowledge of the network topology, the NM
determines if there is physical connectivity between devices A
and B. Second, the NM invokes showPotential () at device A
that allows it to determine the following:
• Name and abstraction for the ETH module at A that is
physically connected to the ETH module at B - let this
module be <ETH,A,c> (or c, for short). While we don’t
show the ETH module abstraction here, the connectable-
modules for the up pipe of this module include IP. Hence,
the NM finds an IP module that can be connected above
c.
• Name and abstraction of the IP module at A that can be
connected above c - let this module be <IP,A,b> (or b).
Using the same logic as above, the NM needs a GRE-
IPnew module that can be connected above b.
• Name and abstraction of the GRE-IPnew module at A
that can be connected above b - let this module be <GRE-
IPv4,A,local> (or local). The module abstraction exposed
by local is shown in table III. It describes the possible
up and down connectivity for local and the trade-offs it
can offer. Using the same logic, the NM determines that
module <IP,A,a> (or a) needs to be connected above
local.
Hence, showPotential() equips the NM with the names of
the modules that need to be connected to create the GRE-
IP tunnel and the module abstractions for these. By contrast,
some manual must be read (either by the implementor of the
NM system or the system administrator) to gain the equivalent
knowledge while configuring GRE-IPold tunnels.
Next, the NM connects the aforementioned modules as
follows: create (pipe, b, c) creates pipe (3), create (pipe, local,
b) creates pipe (2), and create (pipe, a, local) creates pipe (1)6.
In all three cases, the NM needs to satisfy any dependencies
that the pipes being created may have. For example, when
creating pipe (1), the NM needs to satisfy the dependency of
the up pipe of local by providing the name of the peer GRE-
IPnew module - in this case, the NM tells local that the peer
module is peer. The creation of pipes (5) through (7) is similar.
The simple, structured and bottom-up process described
above is all the configuration that the NM needs to do. On
the other hand, the protocol implementations themselves have
to incorporate the complexity of the tunnel establishment. Each
module uses the high-level abstraction and interaction with the
peer modules through the management channel to determine
the required protocol specific parameters – this is shown as
Determining protocol details in figure 5 and is detailed below.
In case of the GRE-IPold configuration, it is the management
plane (either an application or a human) that is expected to
specify the parameters.
create (pipe, local, b) and create (pipe, peer, b’). The
creation of pipes (2) and (6) causes modules b and b’ to figure
6Note that each create command may not lead to the creation of an actual
pipe, as the requisite pipe may already exist due to some previously configured
tunnel. However, the NM need not be aware of this.
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Fig. 5. GRE-IP Tunnel establishment between devices A and B - the
management plane is simplified by ensuring that protocol complexity is
restricted to protocol implementation.
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Fig. 6. GRE-IP tunnels for ISPs’ customers - the figure shows the module
connectivity that the NM aims to achieve
out the IP addresses of tunnel end-points. They determine each
other’s IP addresses through the use of listFieldsAndValues and
actively send packets over the data plane to determine the IPv4
address pair that would allow bidirectional IPv4 connectivity
between them.
create (pipe, a, local) and create (pipe, a’, peer). The
creation of pipes (1) and (7) causes modules local and peer to
exchange the GRE-specific parameters needed for connectivity
between them. These include the key values in each direction,
the use of sequence numbers, etc. Note that some of these
parameters, such as the use of sequence numbers, may be
guided by the trade-off decisions made by the NM.
2) Example configuration scenario: In order to highlight
the advantage of CONMan over the present day management
plane, we discuss a real world tunnel configuration example.
ISPs often use GRE tunnels to carry traffic between distant
customer sites. The tunnel provides traffic differentiation which
can be used for the enforcement of performance, security,
etc. Lets consider an ISP that wants to establish GRE tunnels
between customers at two of its POPs. The customer sites at
the first POP are connected to edge router A while the ones at
the second POP are connected to edge router B.
In CONMan, the NM logic must map the high-level tunnel-
ing goal to what it can do - building pipes and modules. In
order to configure a GRE-IPnew tunnel for the customer-1,
the NM must trace and build a path between the customer-1
#!/bin/bash  
# Inserting the  GRE-IP kernel module    
insmod /lib/modules/2.6.10-1/ip_gre.ko 
# Creating the GRE module with the appropriate key
ip tunnel add name greA mode remote 128.84.223.112 local \
128.84.222.111 ikey 2001 okey 1001 icsum ocsum iseq oseq 
ifconfig greA 192.168.1.3 
# Enable routing
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip-forward  
# Create IP routing state from customer  to tunnel
echo 202 tun-1-2 > /etc/iproute2/rt_tables  
ip rule add iff eth0 table tun-1-2 
ip route add default dev greA table tun-1-2
(3, 4)
(1) 
# Create IP routing state from tunnel to customer
echo 203 tun-2-1 > /etc/iproute2/rt_tables    
ip rule add iff greA table tun-2-1  
ip route add default dev eth0 table tun-2-1
(2)
Fig. 7. Configuration script at A (ISP-facing IP : 128.84.222.111) - the script
tunnels traffic from a customer network attached to eth0 to B (ISP-facing IP
: 128.84.223.112). The GRE-IP tunnel is key’ed, uses sequence numbers and
checksums in both directions.
interfaces of devices A and B that goes through the respective
GRE modules. This is the path labeled as (1) to (11) in figure 6.
Tunnels for the other customers can be configured similarly.
Our implementation of the NM builds various segments of the
aforementioned path as follows:
(a). (1)-(2): Pipe (1) is a physical pipe while pipe (2) is
created by the NM. The ETH module’s abstraction shows
that switching packets between (1) and (2) is its default
operation and hence, does not require any configuration.
(b). (2)-(3): Pipe (3) is created by the NM. The IP module
above the GRE module advertises that it has down-to-
down switching capability and this must be configured
by the NM. Hence, the NM configures the down-to-
down switching at the IP module to achieve connectivity
between pipes (2) and (3).
(c). (3)-(4),(4)-(5),(6)-(7),(7)-(8),(8)-(9): as described in the
previous section, the NM achieves this by creating the
relevant pipes while satisfying the necessary depen-
dencies. In effect, this sequence of pipes represents
customer-1’s GRE tunnel.
(d). (9)-(10): same as (2)-(3).
(e). (10)-(11): same as (1)-(2).
As a contrast, configuring a GRE-IPold tunnel would
require the management plane to specify all the low level
configuration details. Figure 7 shows a Linux configuration
snippet at the customer-facing border router A that establishes
the tunnel for just one customer. Apart from the configuration
being complex, it leaves the door open for many kinds of
errors. Some such error possibilities have been marked in
the figure: (1). not configuring device A as a router, (2).
misconfiguring the underlying routing so that traffic from the
wrong customer goes into a tunnel or the tunneled traffic
is delivered to the wrong customer at the other end, (3).
configuring the tunnel end points with the wrong key values
and (4). using tunnel end point IP addresses that are wrong or
do not have IP connectivity between them.
The CONMan model also allows the NM to debug tunnel
errors. For example, errors like a wire getting cut off or a port
on a line card not working show up in the topology map that
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Fig. 8. A home network with desktops, a router and provider equipment (eg,
DSL-modem). The router advertises its modules and the IP module abstraction
includes its performance enforcement capabilities.
the NM maintains (via the protocol used for maintaining the
management channel). By tracing the network and protocol
graph, the NM may even report what applications are likely
to be affected by such an error. On the other hand, errors
like an invalid filter rule in the ISP’s network that blocks IP
connectivity between the tunnel end points will be detected
when the NM inspects the state of the module with the filter
rule. And errors like path MTU problems are detected by
invoking the IP module’s test function. Hence, the bottom-
up knowledge of the network, the ability to understand the
functionality of modules and the test functions provided by the
modules allow the NM to find the root cause of most errors.
C. Other examples
We now discuss a few example management scenarios that
CONMan can serve useful in – in each case, we very briefly
mention the problem and a possible solution. First, consider
a basic configuration scenario involving printer management
in an enterprise. In the current set-up, users are frequently
befuddled by the various protocols that they can use to connect
to print servers, not to mention configuring the parameters used
by these protocols. For example, our own organization supports
printing using LPD, CUPS, Windows Active-Directory and IPP
and maintains a detailed document (>200 lines) so that users,
CS professionals in this case, can configure printing on their
machines.
In CONMan, the Printer-Client module(s) on the user’s
machine advertises its connectable-modules, the user specifies
his preferences (if any) for the print server to be used, the
administrator specifies the restrictions on which machines can
access which print server and the Printer-Server module on
each print server advertises its connectable modules. With this
information, the NM can connect pipes for the appropriate
Printer-Client and the Printer-Server modules and hence, en-
sure basic printer connectivity. Beyond this, it is the protocol
modules that negotiate their parameters - this might include
authentication based on user credentials. Note that UPnP
offers similar device management capabilities with zero user
configuration. However, UPnP operates on top of the data plane
and forces the control points (analogous to NMs in CONMan)
to understand protocol and vendor specific details. This violates
both principles described in section I. CONMan can ensure
basic device discovery and connnectivity with much less effort
on part of the management plane. Though, on a positive note,
UPnP-enabled protocols are designed to coordinate parameters
with their peer protocols which makes them easy to fit into the
CONMan framework.
Second, consider a performance management scenario in-
volving VOIP usage in a home network. Figure 8 shows
such a home network with multiple desktops connected to
the ISP’s modem through a router. ISPs typically cap the
upload bandwidth of their customers. Meanwhile, the user may
want to ensure good call quality and web browsing experience
regardless of the background traffic. Many companies already
offer routers for home networks with in-built QoS enforcement
capabilities for this very purpose [48]. In CONMan, the IPnew
module in the router advertises its performance enforcement
capabilities, the user specifies his priorities (and other infor-
mation like the maximum number of simultaneous calls) and
application modules specify their bandwidth requirements. For
example, the VOIP application being used, lets say a Skype-
client, may advertise that it produces traffic at a constant rate
of 15 Kbps per call [50]. This information allows the NM
to configure the performance enforcement capabilities of the
router. Our IPnew implementation supports such configuration
- currently, the NM restricts the output rate to the cap value and
prioritizes traffic according to user/application specifications,
all without knowing the details of how priority is enforced and
how traffic from a particular application module is identified.
Third, consider a basic debugging scenario involving prob-
lems in accessing a web-site from a host. In CONMan, the
NM debugs the problem by actually trying to configure various
modules in the host to establish connectivity to the web-site
in question. The NM directs the creation of pipes between
the host’s HTTP-client module, TCP module, IP module and
ETH module and then invokes the respective test functions.
A problem with DNS shows up in the creation of the down
pipe for the HTTP-client module (which advertises that the
creation of a down pipe has a dependency on DNS). The web
server being down shows up when the test function for the TCP
module is invoked. Routing and physical connectivity problems
inside the host’s domain are detected directly by the NM while
external routing and physical connectivity problems show up
when the test function for the IP module is invoked. While
the NM may only be able to address some of these issues, the
debugging done by the NM would certainly be useful when
the system administrator is called in.
Finally, consider a security management scenario involving
enforcement of a security policy in an enterprise network. The
NM can configure and enforce policies such as an access
matrix specifying what machines should be able to reach
each other (by configuring filters in IP modules appropriately
or by doing what 4D had proposed), what machines should
have secure connectivity between them (by establishing IP-
Sec tunnels between machines) and so on. The NM, given
its network wide view, can also detect any violation of these
policies. For example, a user bringing his home equipment
(laptop, access-point, etc.) to work would show up as a new
device and associated pipes that are against the specified
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security policy7.
IV. RELATED WORK
The heterogeneity in the size, technology and needs of
domains making up the Internet has given rise to a large
variety of management tools. These vary from low-end tools
like packet analyzers (eg, Ethereal [42]), traffic monitors (eg,
MRTG [37]), and SNMP agents (eg, ITM [6]) to highly sophis-
ticated Network Management Systems (eg, OpenView [43]).
SNMPLink [32] gives an extensive and categorized list of such
management tools. The number and varied operation of these
tools corroborates our claim that no single approach suffices
for managing today’s networks.
The research and the standards community have also tried
to address the network’s management needs. At the root
of these is the notion of a management station controlling
various devices through their management interfaces which
formed the basis of management standards like SNMP and
RMON [34]. Lately, a majority of the proposals have focussed
on the improving the scalability, reducing the overhead and
promoting reusability of components by doing some part of the
management at the devices themselves. These include efforts
like management by delegation [15], using mobile agents
for management [31] and pattern-based management [24].
However, none of these address the problem arising out of
the very detailed and hugely varying interfaces exposed by
protocols and devices.
Policy-based management [17] tries to reduce the amount of
intricate knowledge required by network managers by allowing
management of QoS [33], [2] and security [39] based on
high-level policies. While a step in the right direction, some
entity still has to map these policies to the individual device
configurations. The complexity of this mapping was the major
impediment in the adoption of policy-based networking by
major vendors and enterprises [18]. As a contrast, CONMan
argues that the management plane should perform the much
easier task of mapping policies to the generic abstraction ex-
posed by devices. Also, all the commercial tools and standards
discussed above suffer from having the management plane
depend on the data plane.
The question of coming up with abstractions for protocols
has been asked previously in the context of protocol imple-
mentation (Morpheus [1]), protocol specification (Estelle, LO-
TOS, SDL [40]) and fault localization in model-based systems
(see [14] for examples). Click [20] presents a fine grained
abstraction for the IP module as the basis for building flexible
and configurable routers. A lot of work has also been done on
modular implementations of protocols (eg, [4]). Recently, the
P2 project proposed declarative and componentized implemen-
tations of routing protocols [26], overlays [25] and transport
protocols [10]. This paper does not argue for implementation
modularity. Rather, our goal was to capture the essence of most
protocols for the purpose of manageability using a simple and
7assuming that the device is incorporated in the management channel in the
first place
generic abstraction and make these protocols, regardless of how
they are implemented, expose it.
The 4D proposal [16] recognizes the complexity of the
Internet’s control and management plane and hence, argues
for restructuring them. We were motivated by, among other
things, 4D’s decision plane and have proposed some man-
agement channel extensions to support multiple NMs. While
4D focusses on routing-related management issues, CONMan
is a proposal for stack-wide configuration and debugging. As
mentioned earlier, 4D’s proposal for doing away with routing
and switching protocols also fits into our framework, though
we are not sure if this should be the case or if this should be
done for other control protocols too.
Recently, there has been a spurt of research detailing the
reasons for outages and anomalies in IP backbones [23], [28],
Internet services [30] and BGP routing [12], [27]. These studies
point to configuration errors as a major culprit. CONMan
reduces the management plane’s burden by restricting the com-
plexity of protocols to their operation and hence, can reduce
these errors, particularly the ones directly impacting data plane
operation. We believe that our proposal has the potential to
achieve the Knowledge Plane objectives laid out by Clark et.
al. [7] - our current proposal presents the knowledge plane for
individual domains and can be extended to an Internet-wide
knowledge plane.
Kompella et. al [21] present a strong case for maintaining
cross-layer dependencies and argue for a cross-layer database
with a fixed interface (for the imported information) to do so.
We agree with the need to maintain these associations and think
that our abstraction can serve as such an interface. This would
simplify both the database and the management applications
that use it. Also, the authors suggest using SNMP and other
measurement-based approaches to populate the database. We
propose that the network devices provide the management
plane with information about themselves through a manage-
ment channel which is independent of the data plane.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a network architecture that
is amenable to management. Implementation of the GRE and
IP protocols according to the CONMan model and their use in
real world configuration scenarios shows that the approach has
a lot of promise. Though it is too early for us to claim that the
abstraction presented here suffices for all data plane protocols,
we do not envision the module abstraction expanding much
beyond its current state. Having a small module abstraction
that is generic enough has a lot of benefits and we believe
that expanding upon it will run into diminishing returns. In
cases where protocol features (if any) are not captured by
the abstraction, the protocol parameters will have to be set
explicitly.
The ease-of-management achieved by our architecture has
some security implications. One could argue that the complex
and disjoint management set-up existing today reduces the
impact of network security breaches. CONMan addresses the
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root of the problem by allowing for specification of security
policies that the network elements can enforce. This reduces
the possibility of a break in, allows for detection when someone
does break in and can even be used to trace back the attacker’s
actions (in a fashion similar to debugging of configuration
errors). Also, our design decisions, such as restricting NMs
to their scopes and making the management channel default-
off, follow the principle of least privileges and should serve
to address the security concerns. While an evaluation of the
net impact of CONMan on network security is an important
avenue of future research, we can at least claim the higher
moral ground of not doing security through obscurity.
There are numerous other issues and challenges posed by
our proposal. In the interest of brevity, we simply mention a
couple of them: applying CONMan to networks other than the
traditional wired networks, allowing for product differentiation
in the face of our generic module abstraction, and having
an incremental deployment model for CONMan. In response
to the last issue, one could imagine an intermediate scenario
whereby all protocols expose their abstraction as a meta-MIB
which is then accessed and configured by the NM through
SNMP (this does not satisfy the first principle presented in the
paper and hence, does not reap all of CONMan’s benefits). We
believe that this can serve as a path of least resistance towards
the widespread adoption of CONMan and hence, towards
the ultimate goal of a manageable (or even, self-managing)
network.
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